Private computation in a distributed storage system (DSS) is a generalization of the private information retrieval (PIR) problem. In such setting a user wishes to compute a function of f messages stored in noncolluding coded databases while revealing no information about the desired function to the databases. We consider the problem of private polynomial computation (PPC). In PPC, a user wishes to compute a multivariate polynomial of degree at most g over f variables (or messages) stored in multiple databases. First, we consider the private computation of polynomials of degree g = 1, i.e., private linear computation (PLC) for coded databases. In PLC, a user wishes to compute a linear combination over the f messages while keeping the coefficients of the desired linear combination hidden from the database. For a linearly encoded DSS, we present a capacity-achieving PLC scheme and show that the PLC capacity, which is the ratio of the desired amount of information and the total amount of downloaded information, matches the maximum distance separable coded capacity of PIR for a large class of linear storage codes. Then, we consider private computation of higher degree polynomials, i.e., g > 1. For this setup, we construct two novel PPC schemes. In the first scheme we consider Reed-Solomon coded databases with Lagrange encoding, which leverages ideas from recently proposed star-product PIR and Lagrange coded computation. The second scheme considers the special case of coded databases with systematic Lagrange encoding. Both schemes yield improved rates compared to the best known schemes from the literature for a small number of messages, while asymptotically, as f → ∞, the systematic scheme gives a significantly better computation rate compared to all known schemes up to some storage code rate that depends on the maximum degree of the candidate polynomials.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of private information retrieval (PIR) from public databases, introduced by Chor et al. [3] , has been the focus of attention for several decades in the computer science community (see, e.g., [4] - [6] ). The goal of PIR is to allow a user to privately access an arbitrary message stored in a set of databases, i.e., without revealing any information of the identity of the requested message to each database. If the users do not have any side information on the data stored in the databases, the best strategy is to store the messages in at least two databases while ensuring PIR. Hence, the design of PIR protocols has focused on the case when multiple databases store the messages. This connects to the active and renowned research area of distributed storage systems (DSSs), where the data is encoded by an [n, k] linear code and then distributed and stored across n storage nodes [7] , usually referred to as coded DSSs. Using coding techniques, coded DSSs possess many practical features and benefits such as high reliability, efficient repairability, robustness, and security [8] . Recently, the aspect of minimizing the communication cost, e.g., the required rate or bandwidth of privately querying the databases with the desired requests and downloading the corresponding information from the databases has attracted a great deal of attention in the information theory and coding communities. Thus, the renewed interest in PIR primarily focused on the study and design of efficient PIR protocols for coded DSSs (see, e.g., [9] - [16] ).
A recently proposed generalization of the PIR problem [17] - [22] addresses the private computation (PC) for functions of the stored messages, also denoted as private function retrieval. In PC a user has access to a given number of databases and intends to compute a function of messages stored in these databases. This function is kept private from the databases, as they may be under the control of an adversary. In [17] , [18] , the scenario of private linear functions computation is considered for noncolluding replicated databases. In these works, the capacity and achievable rates for the communication overhead needed to privately compute a given linear function, called private linear computation (PLC), were derived as a function of the number of messages and the number of databases, respectively. Interestingly, the obtained PLC capacity is equal to the PIR capacity of [11] . The extension to the coded case is addressed in [20] - [22] . In particular, in [20] we proposed a PLC scheme based on maximum distance separable (MDS) coded storage. The presented scheme is able to achieve the MDS-coded PIR capacity established in [13] , referred to as the MDS-PIR capacity in the sequel. In [21] , private polynomial computation (PPC) over t colluding and systematically coded databases is considered by generalizing the star-product PIR scheme of [15] . In that work, the functions to be computed are polynomials of degree at most g, and a PC rate equal to the best asymptotic PIR rate of MDS-coded storage (when the number of messages tends to infinity) is achieved for g = t = 1 (the case of linear function retrieval and noncolluding databases). An alternative PPC approach was recently proposed in [22] for polynomials with higher degree, i.e., g > 1, by employing Reed-Solomon (RS) coded databases with Lagrange encoding. For low code rates, the scheme improves on the PC rate of [21] . Finally, a separate but relevant form of PC, the private search (PS) problem [19] considers mapping records replicated over n noncolluding databases to binary search patterns. Each pattern represents the search result of one value out of a set of candidate alphabets. The asymptotic capacity, i.e., information retrieval rate for PS with large alphabet size, of privately retrieving one search pattern is found to match the asymptotic capacity of PIR for the special case of balanced PS. In a balanced PS scenario, the nonlinearly dependent search patterns are assumed to contain equal amount of information. An overview of how these extensions align together can be seen in Fig. 1 .
In another line of research, for the case of noncolluding databases, two PIR protocols for a DSS where data is stored using a non-MDS linear code, are proposed in [16] , and their protocols are shown to achieve both the asymptotic and the nonasymptotic MDS-PIR capacity for a large class of linear codes. The first family of non-MDS codes for which the PIR capacity is known is found in [23] , [24] . Further, PIR on linearly-coded databases for the case of colluding databases is also addressed in [14] - [16] , [25] . For the PC case with noncolluding databases, however, capacity results for arbitrary linearly-coded DSSs have not been addressed so far in the open literature to the best of our knowledge.
In this work, we intend to fill this void by proposing three PC schemes and deriving an outer bound on the PC rate over all possible PC protocols. Our contributions are outlined as follow.
• For the capacity of PPC, we adapt the converse proof of [24, Thm. 4 ] to the coded PPC problem and derive an outer bound on the PPC rate (see Theorem 2) . From this outer bound, as a special case of PPC when g = 1, we prove a converse bound for the coded PLC capacity (see Theorem 3) . The significance of our PLC converse is that, in contrast to [17] , it is valid for any number of messages f and any number of candidate linear combinations µ. In addition, our converse result depends on the rank of the coefficient matrix obtained from all µ linear combinations. • A capacity-achieving PLC scheme for a large class of linearly-coded DSSs with noncolluding databases is proposed. Essentially, the proposed PLC scheme jointly extends the optimal PIR scheme from DSSs coded with the MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes of [16] and the PLC scheme from MDS-coded DSSs of [20] , strictly generalizing the replication-based PC schemes of [17] , [18] . As for the optimality of the achievable PLC rate, we prove that the achievable rate matches the PLC converse bound of Theorem 3 and settle the coded PLC capacity (see Theorem 4) . • For higher degree PPC, i.e., g > 1, we present two new approaches for PPC from RS-coded DSSs by generalizing the presented capacity-achieving PLC scheme and leveraging ideas from star-product PIR [15] and Lagrange coded computation [26] . Although the problem of PPC from Lagrange encoded DSSs was recently studied in [22] , the authors were mainly concerned with constructing explicit PPC schemes with focus on preserving privacy against colluding DSSs. We, on the other hand, aim our attention at providing PPC solutions that minimize the download cost and we focus on establishing the capacity of the PPC setup. Towards that aim, we propose two PPC schemes from RS-coded noncolluding databases with Lagrange encoding (one for systematic encoding) that improve on the rate of the PPC schemes presented in [21] , [22] (see Theorems 5 and 6) . The systematic scheme is an improved version of the systematic scheme presented in [2] . To demonstrate the performance of our proposed PPC schemes, a number of examples and numerical results are presented. We show that, compared to the schemes in [21] , [22] , both proposed PPC schemes yield a larger PC rate, i.e., lower download cost, when the number of messages is small. As the number of messages tends to infinity, the achievable rate of our RS-coded (nonsystematic) PPC scheme approaches the rate of [22] (see Corollary 1), while our systematic scheme outperforms all known schemes up to some storage code rate that depends on the maximum degree of the candidate polynomials (see Remark 1 and Corollary 2). The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II outlines the notation and basic definitions, then the problem of PPC from coded DSSs and the system model are presented. A motivating and almost self-contained example is given in Section III. We derive the converse bound for an arbitrary number of messages and polynomial functions in Section IV. A generic query generation scheme for PC for linearly-coded storage with an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code is presented in Section V. This scheme acts as a building block for the three schemes constructed in the following sections. In Section VI we present the capacity-achieving PLC scheme. In Sections VII and VIII, we propose two PPC schemes for RS-coded storage and higher degree polynomials with examples. Then, in Section IX, numerical results for the proposed PPC schemes and the converse bound from Section IV are presented, establishing the achievability of larger retrieval rates compared with PPC schemes from the literature. Some conclusions are drawn in Section X.
II. PRELIMINARIES

A. Notation
We denote by N the set of all positive integers and let N 0 {0} ∪ N, [a] {1, 2, . . . , a}, and [a : b] {a, a + 1, . . . , b} for a, b ∈ N, a ≤ b. Random and deterministic quantities are carefully distinguished as follows. A random variable is denoted by a capital Roman letter, e.g., X, while its realization is denoted by the corresponding small Roman letter, e.g., x. Vectors are boldfaced, e.g., X denotes a random vector and x denotes a deterministic vector, respectively. The notation X ∼ Y is used to indicate that X and Y are identically distributed. Random matrices are represented by bold sans serif letters, e.g., X, where X represents its realization. In addition, sets are denoted by calligraphic uppercase letters, e.g., X , and X c denotes the complement of a set X in a universe set. We denote a submatrix of X that is restricted in columns by the set I by X| I . For a given index set S, we also write X S and Y S to represent X (v) : v ∈ S and Y j : j ∈ S , respectively. Furthermore, some constants and functions are also depicted by Greek letters or a special font, e.g., X. The function H(X) represents the entropy of X, and I(X ;Y ) the mutual information between X and Y . The binomial coefficient of a over b, a, b ∈ N 0 , is denoted by a b where a b = 0 if a < b. The notation · denotes the floor function. We use the customary code parameters [n, k] to denote a code C over the finite field F q of blocklength n and dimension k. A generator matrix of C is denoted by G C . A set of coordinates of C , I ⊆ [n], of size k is said to be an information set if and only if G C | I is invertible. (·) T denotes the transpose operator, while rank(V) denotes the rank of a matrix V. The function χ(x) denotes the support of a vector x, and the linear span of a set of vectors {x 1 , . . . , x a }, a ∈ N, is denoted by span{x 1 , . . . , x a }.
A monomial z i in m variables z 1 , . . . , z m with degree g is written as
monomials in m variables of degree at most g has size
Moreover, a polynomial φ(z) of degree at most g is represented as φ(z) = i:wt(i)≤g a i z i , a i ∈ F q . The total number of polynomials in m variables of degree at most g generated with all possible distinct (up to scalar multiplication) M(m, g)-dimensional coefficients vectors defined over F q is equal to µ(m, g) q M(m,g) −1
denotes the set of all univariate polynomials over F q in the variable z, and we denote by deg(φ(z)) the degree of a polynomial φ(z) ∈ F q [z].
B. Definitions
Definition 1 (Star-product). Let C and D be two linear codes of length n over F q . The star-product (Hadamard product) of v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ) ∈ C and u = (u 1 , . . . , u n ) ∈ D is defined as v u = (v 1 u 1 , . . . , v n u n ) ∈ F n q . Further, the star-product of C and D, denoted by C D, is defined by span{v u : v ∈ C , u ∈ D} and the g-fold star-product of C with itself is given by
Definition 2 (RS code). Let α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) be a vector of n distinct elements of F q . For n ∈ N, k ∈ [n], and q ≥ n, the [n, k] RS code (over F q ) is defined as
It is well-known that RS codes are MDS codes that behave well under the star-product. We state the following proposition that was introduced in [15] . Proposition 1. Let RS k (α) be a length-n RS code. Then, for g ∈ N, the g-fold star-product of RS k (α) with itself is the RS code given by RS g k (α) = RS min {g(k−1)+1,n} (α). Let γ = (γ 1 , . . . , γ k ) be a vector of k distinct elements of F q . For a message vector W = (W 1 , . . . , W k ), let (z) ∈ F q [z] be a polynomial of degree at most k − 1 such that (γ i ) = W i for all i ∈ [k]. Using the Lagrange interpolation formula we present this polynomial as
It has been shown in [22] that Lagrange encoding is equivalent to the choice of a specific basis for an RS code. Thus, for encoding we choose the set of Lagrange basis polynomials as the code generating polynomials of (1) [26] . Thus, a generator matrix of
, then the generator matrix G RS k (α, γ) becomes systematic.
We now proceed with a general description for the problem statement of private function computation from linearly-coded DSSs.
C. Problem Statement and System Model
The PC problem for coded DSSs is described as follows. We consider a DSS that stores in total f independent messages W (1) , . . . , is encoded by an [n, k] code C over F q into a length-n codeword C
i,n . The βf generated codewords C (m) i are then arranged in the array C = (C (1) 
, for all f messages are stored on the j-th database, j ∈ [n]. We consider the case of n noncolluding databases. In private function computation, a user wishes to privately compute exactly one function image X
L are independent and identically distributed according to a prototype random variable X (v) with probability mass function P X (v) . Thus,
The user privately selects an index v ∈ [µ] and wishes to compute the v-th function while keeping the requested function index v private from each database. In order to retrieve the desired function evaluation X (v) , v ∈ [µ], from the coded DSS, the user sends a query Q (v) j to the j-th database for all j ∈ [n] as illustrated in Fig. 2 . Since the queries are generated by the user without any prior knowledge of the realizations of the candidate functions, the queries are independent of the candidate functions evaluations. In other words, we have
In response to the received query, database j sends the answer A
1,j , . . . , C
β,j , C
T denotes the f coded chunks that are stored in the j-th database.
To preserve user's privacy, the query-answer function must be identically distributed for each possible desired function index v ∈ [µ] from the perspective of each database j ∈ [n]. In other words, the scheme's queries and answer strings must be independent from the desired function index. Moreover, the user must be able to reliably decode the desired polynomial function evaluation X (v) . Accordingly, we define a PC protocol for [n, k] coded DSSs as follows.
Consider a DSS with n noncolluding databases storing f messages using an [n, k] code. The user wishes to retrieve the v-th function evaluation
. For a PC protocol, the following conditions must be satisfied
[Recovery]
From an information-theoretic perspective, the efficiency of a PC protocol is measured by the PC rate, which is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (PC rate and capacity for linearly-coded DSSs). The exact information-theoretic rate of a PC scheme, denoted by R, is defined as the ratio of the minimum desired function size L H min over the total required download cost, i.e.,
where D is the total required download cost. The PC capacity C PC is the maximum of all achievable PC rates over all possible PC protocols for a given [n, k] storage code.
D. MDS-PIR Capacity-Achieving Codes
In [16] , a PIR protocol for any linearly-coded DSS that uses an [n, k] code to store f messages, named Protocol 1, is proposed. The PIR rate of Protocol 1 can be derived by finding a PIR achievable rate matrix of the underlying storage code C , which is defined as follows.
Definition 4 ([16, Def. 10]). Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code. A ν × n binary matrix Λ PIR κ,ν (C ) is said to be a PIR achievable rate matrix for C if the following conditions are satisfied.
1) The Hamming weight of each column of Λ PIR κ,ν is κ, and 2) for each matrix row λ i , i ∈ [ν], χ(λ i ) always contains an information set. In other words, each coordinate j of C , j ∈ [n], appears exactly κ times in {χ(λ i )} i∈ [ν] , and every set χ(λ i ) contains an information set.
Example 1. Consider a [4, 2] code C with generator matrix
One can verify that Λ PIR 1,2 = 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 is a valid PIR achievable rate matrix for C with (κ, ν) = (1, 2) . This is true given that, column-wise, the Hamming weight of each column in Λ PIR 1,2 is κ = 1. On the other hand, row-wise, χ(λ 1 ) = {1, 3} and χ(λ 2 ) = {2, 4} are two information sets of C .
In [16] , it is shown that the MDS-PIR capacity [13] can be achieved using Protocol 1 for a special class of [n, k] codes. In particular, to achieve the MDS-PIR capacity using Protocol 1, the [n, k] storage code should possess a specific underlying structure as given by the following theorem.
Theorem 1 ([16, Cor. 1]). Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] code C to store f messages. If a PIR achievable rate matrix Λ PIR κ,ν (C ) with κ ν = k n exists, then the MDS-PIR capacity
This gives rise to the following definition.
Definition 5 ([16, Def. 13]). Given an [n, k] code C , if a PIR achievable rate matrix Λ PIR κ,ν (C ) with κ ν = k n exists, then the code C is referred to as an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code, and the matrix Λ PIR κ,ν (C ) is called an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix.
Accordingly, one can easily see that the [4, 2] code C given in Example 1 is an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code. Note that the class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes includes MDS codes, cyclic codes, Reed-Muller codes, and certain classes of distance-optimal local reconstruction codes [16] .
III. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
To illustrate the key concept of the proposed PC schemes, in this subsection we present a motivating example of PLC from replicated databases.
Consider three messages W (1) , W (2) , and W (3) that are stored in a DSS using a [2, 1] repetition code C . Suppose that the user wishes to obtain a linear function evaluation X (v) from the set {X (1) = W (1) + W (3) , X (2) = W (1) + W (2) , X (3) = X (1) + X (2) , X (4) = 3X (1) + X (2) } of µ = 4 candidate linear function evaluations. First, to make the symbols downloaded from each database appear random and independent from the desired linear function index v, we first select a random permutation function over [β], denoted by π(·), where β = 2 µ = 16, and let
T . Let the desired linear function index be v = 1, i.e., the user wishes to obtain X (1) . To retrieve the desired linear function evaluation X (1) , symbols are downloaded from the two databases in a total of 4 rounds as shown in Table I . Initialization (Round τ = 1): The user first downloads 1 distinct instance of x t,j from each database. By message symmetry this also applies to y t,j , z t,j , and w t,j . The symbols downloaded in the first round are shown in Table I .
Following Rounds (τ ∈ [2 : 4]): As can be seen from Table I , in each round and for each database, the user further downloads sums of τ symbols. The downloaded sums either contain a single symbol from the desired linear function evaluation (so-called desired symbols) or only symbols from undesired linear functions evaluations (socalled undesired symbols, referred to as side information in the sequel). One can see that by utilizing the undesired symbols downloaded from the previous round, the desired linear function evaluations can be decoded. For example, in round 3, since the storage code is a [2, 1] repetition code, the sum y 7,1 + z 6,1 can be obtained by knowing the sum y 7,2 + z 6,2 downloaded from the 2nd database in round 2. Thus, the corresponding desired symbol x 9,1 can be obtained by cancelling the side information. Similarly, one can verify the successful recovery of all symbols of the desired message X (1) from the queried desired sums shown in Table I . Note that after deciding which desired sums to download, the undesired sums to download can be decided by enforcing message symmetry. Moreover, given that this PC scheme is following the symmetry principles of PIR schemes, in the same way as for the PIR scheme in [11] , privacy is inherently ensured. Linear Dependency Exploitation: It is important to highlight that the linear dependencies among the candidate linear function evaluations can further be used to reduce the total number of downloaded symbols. From the initialization step, i.e., round τ = 1, it can be easily seen that since X (3) and X (4) are linear combinations of X (1) and X (2) , the symbols z t,j and w t,j can be reconstructed offline by the user and thus can be removed from the download. However, for the following rounds τ > 1 we need to introduce constructive linear dependencies among the sums to be exploited offline. To this end, we adopt a deterministic sign assignment procedure over {+1, −1} to each symbol in the downloaded sums based on the desired linear function index v as introduced in [17, Sec. IV-B]. Here, a sign σ (v) t ∈ {+1, −1} is first privately generated by the user with a uniform distribution over {−1, +1} and appended to all query symbols with the same index t ∈ [β]. This sign acts as a one-time pad to maintain privacy by randomizing over the deterministic sign assignment procedure, as elaborated below. Specifically, each symbol in the query sets is carefully scaled by {+1, −1} following the deterministic sign assignment procedure to introduce a solvable system of linear equations based on the downloaded sums from different databases. The resulting sums to download after sign assignment are shown in Table II where the redundant sums are marked in blue. Moreover, to illustrate that the deterministic sign assignment procedure depends on the desired linear function, we include in Table II the query set of the 1st database for retrieving the linear function X (3) , i.e., v = 3. Note that after removing the redundant sums from each database, the desired function evaluations can still be recovered. For example, consider the 1st database. One can easily see that the symbols z 1,1 and w 1,1 are redundant in round 1. Moreover, in round 2, one can verify that
and hence we do not need to download the sum z 5,1 − w 4,1 . In a similar manner, redundant sums can be removed from the download from the 2nd database. To see that the user's privacy is still maintained after the removal of redundant sums, we show that the sums are identically distributed for any v ∈ [4] . First note that the privacy before removal of redundant sums is already ensured due to the symmetries of the query sets and the user-private random index permutation and sign assignment σ (v) . Thus, we only need to show that for any desired index v ∈ [4] , the removed redundant sums are of the form of z * ,1 − w * ,1 , irrespective of the row indices. For instance, consider the 1st database. In the 1st round, it is clear that z 1,1 and w 1,1 are redundant, no matter which v is requested. In the 2nd round, see again Table II , it can be shown that the downloaded sums for desired index v = 3 satisfy the equation
which implies that the sum z 5,1 − w 2,1 can be removed from the download, since z 5,1 can be obtained from downloading x 4,1 − y 3,1 , x 5,1 − w 3,1 , x 2,1 − z 3,1 , y 2,1 − z 4,1 , and y 5,1 − w 4,1 . Hence, the redundant symbol for v = 3 is similar to the form of z * ,1 − w * ,1 as for v = 1 (see (3)). A similar argument can be made for v = 2 and v = 4, which ensures the privacy of the scheme.
The PLC rate becomes R = 16 12·2 = 2 3 , which is equal to the corresponding PIR capacity for 3 messages. In summary, from the example above we can extract three important design principles as follows. 1) Enforce message symmetry within the dowloaded sums from each database. 2) Exploit side information of undesired sums downloaded from other databases to retrieve desired function evaluations. 3) Utilize linear dependencies among the candidate functions evaluations.
IV. CONVERSE BOUND
In [23] , [24] , the PIR capacity for a coded DSS using an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code is shown to be equal to the MDS-PIR capacity. In this section, we derive an outer bound on the PPC rate (Theorem 2 below) by adapting the converse proof of [24, Thm. 4 ] to the scenario of the linearly-coded PPC problem, where the storage code is MDS-PIR capacity-achieving. The converse is valid for any number of messages f and candidate functions µ. Then, we state the converse bound for PLC, as a special case, in Theorem 3 and show that it matches the MDS-PIR capacity (i.e., the PIR capacity for a DSS where data is encoded and stored using an MDS code).
We first define an effective rank for the PC problem as follows.
and we define the set L { 1 , . . . , r } ⊆ [µ] to be a minimum set that satisfies (4).
Note that, when the candidate functions are of degree at most g = 1, it can be seen that there is a deterministic linear mapping V of size µ × f between X
Accordingly, an upper bound on the capacity of PPC for a coded DSS where data is encoded and stored using an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code introduced in Definition 5, is stated in the following.
A. General Converse
Theorem 2. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding databases that uses an [n, k] MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code C to store f messages. Then, the maximum achievable PPC rate over all possible PPC protocols, i.e., the PPC capacity C PPC , is upper bounded by
for any effective rank r
Here, we remark that Theorem 2 generalizes [19, Thm. 1], which is a converse bound on the capacity of dependent PIR (DPIR) for noncolluding replicated databases.
Before we proceed with the converse proof, we provide some general results that are useful for the proof. 1) From the condition of privacy,
where
denotes the set of all possible queries made by the user. Although this seems to be intuitively true, a proof of this property is still required and can be found in [13] .
2) Consider a PPC protocol for a coded DSS that uses an [n, k] code C to store f messages. For any subset of function evaluations X V , V ⊆ [µ], and for any information set I of C , we have
The proof uses the linear independence of the columns of a generator matrix of C corresponding to an information set, and can be seen as a simple extension of [13, Lem. 1]. This argument applies to the case of PPC due to the fact that A
(v)
I is still a deterministic function of independent random variables {C j : j ∈ I} and Q. Next, we state Shearer's Lemma, which represents a very useful entropy method for combinatorial problems.
Lemma 1 (Shearer's Lemma [27] ). Let S be a collection of subsets of [n], with each j ∈ [n] included in at least κ members of S . For random variables Z 1 , . . . , Z n , we have
Now, we are ready for the converse proof. By [16, Lem. 2] , since the code C is MDS-PIR capacity-achieving, there exist ν information sets I 1 , . . . , I ν such that each coordinate j ∈ [n] is included in exactly κ members of I = {I 1 , . . . , I ν } with κ ν = k n . Applying the chain rule of entropy we have
Let v ∈ V and v ∈ V c [µ] \ V. Following similar steps as in the proof given in [13] , [28] , we get
where (8) and (10) follow from (7); (9) is because of (6); (11) is due to the Shearer's Lemma; (12) is from the fact that the v -th function evaluation X (v ) is determined by the answers A (v )
[n] and all possible queries Q; and finally, (13) follows from the independence between all possible queries and the messages. Therefore, we can conclude that
where we have used Definition 5 to obtain (14) .
Since there are in total µ function evaluations, by Definition 6 we can recursively use (14) r − 1 times with
where (15) follows from the nonnegativity of entropy. Here, we also remark that the recursive steps follow the same principle of the general converse for DPIR from [19, Thm. 1] . In [19] , the authors claim that the general converse for the DPIR problem strongly depends on the chosen permutation of the indices of the candidate functions. Here, we also recognize a similar observation and assume that the order of indices { 1 , . . . , r } is the permutation that maximizes the summation term of (15) and consider that X ( 1 ) is the polynomial function evaluation with the minimum entropy, i.e., H
where (16) holds since any message is independent of the queries Q, and knowing the answers A
[n] and the queries Q, one can determine X ( 1 ) , and (17) follows directly from (15) .
Finally, the converse proof is completed by showing that
where (18) holds because of the chain rule of entropy, (19) is due to the fact that conditioning reduces entropy, and we apply (17) to obtain (20) .
B. Special Case: PLC Converse
Restricting the candidate polynomial set to degree g = 1 polynomials gives rise to an interesting property following the linear dependencies between the function evaluations. In this subsection, we show how this property will reduce the general coded PPC converse bound to the coded PLC converse stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding databases that uses an [n, k] MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code C to store f messages. Then, the maximum achievable PLC rate over all possible PLC protocols, i.e., the PLC capacity C PLC , is upper bounded by
where r is the rank of the linear mapping from (5) .
To this end, we need the following lemma, whose proof is presented in Appendix A.
the entries corresponding to the pivot elements of V. It follows that X (i 1 ) , . . . ,
Proof of Theorem 3: Now, from (20), we have
where (21) holds since it follows from Lemma 2 that H X
For the PLC case, H min = H (B) min = 1, and the claim follows. It can be easily seen that the converse bound of Theorem 3 matches the MDS-PIR capacity C MDS-PIR for f = r files given in Theorem 1.
V. GENERIC QUERY GENERATION FOR PC FROM CODED DSSS
In this section, we construct a generic query generation algorithm for a PIR-like scheme, where its dependent virtual messages represent the evaluations of the µ candidate polynomial functions. The constructed generic algorithm is a generalized version of our query generation algorithm for PLC from coded DSSs, that first appeared in [1] , and will act as the main building block for the PC schemes presented in this work.
A. Generic PC Achievable Rate Matrix
Similar to Definition 4, we now extend the notion of a PIR achievable rate matrix for the coded PIR problem to a coded generic PC problem.
κ,ν is called a generic PC achievable rate matrix if its column weight is equal to κ, i.e., Λ PC κ,ν is a κ-column regular matrix. Clearly, a PIR achievable rate matrix Λ PIR κ,ν is a generic PC achievable rate matrix. In general, the condition for each row for a generic PC achievable rate matrix is not given, since it is not needed for generating the queries from our proposed algorithm. The required condition for each row of a particular PC achievable rate matrix will be specified in the subsequent sections, depending on the specific PC scheme considered.
In [16, Def. 11] , two PIR interference matrices are defined from a PIR achievable rate matrix. Similar to the notion of PIR interference matrices, given a generic PC achievable rate matrix Λ PC κ,ν , we can also formally define the PC interference matrices A κ×n and B (ν−κ)×n , which are given by the following definition.
Definition 8. For a given ν × n generic PC achievable rate matrix Λ PC κ,ν (C ) = (λ u,j ), we define the PC interference matrices A κ×n = (a i,j ) and B (ν−κ)×n = (b i,j ) for the code C as
Note that in Definition 8, for each j ∈ [n], distinct values of u ∈ [ν] should be assigned for all i. Thus, the assignment is not unique in the sense that the order of the entries of each column of A and B can be permuted.
Note that the j-th column of A κ×n contains the row indices of Λ κ,ν whose entries in the j-th column are equal to 1, while B (ν−κ)×n contains the remaining row indices of Λ κ,ν . Hence, it can be observed that
Next, for the sake of illustrating our generic query generation algorithm, we make use of the following definition.
Definition 9. By S(u|A κ×n ) we denote the set of column coordinates of matrix A κ×n = (a i,j ) in which at least one of its entries is equal to u, i.e.,
As a result, we require the size of the message to be L = ν µ · k (i.e., β = ν µ ).
B. Generic Query Generation
In this subsection, we construct the generic queries that will be used in a coded PC scheme for µ dependent virtual messages, which represent the evaluations of the µ candidate functions. Before running the main algorithm to generate the query sets, the following index preparation for the coded symbols stored in each database is performed.
1) Index Preparation: The goal is to make the symbols queried from each database to appear to be chosen randomly and independently from the desired function index. Note that the function is computed separately for the t-th row of all messages, t ∈ [β]. Therefore, similar to the PLC scheme in [17] and the MDS-coded PLC scheme in [20] , we apply a permutation that is fixed across all coded symbols for the t-th row to maintain the dependency across the associated message elements. Let π(·) be a random permutation function over [β], and let
denote the t-th permuted symbol associated with the v -th virtual message
T . The permutation π(·) is randomly selected privately and uniformly by the user.
2) Preliminaries: The query generation procedure is subdivided into µ rounds, where in each round τ we generate the queries based on the concept of τ -sums as defined in the following.
, where a round represents the queries for all possible µ τ types of τ -sums. For each round the query subset is further subdivided into two subsets. The first subset Q j . To this end, the algorithm will generate κn auxiliary query sets Q
where each query consists of a distinct symbol from the desired function evaluation and τ − 1 symbols from undesired functions evaluations, and (ν − κ)n auxiliary query sets Q
, to represent the query sets of symbols from the undesired functions evaluations for each database j ∈ [n]. We utilize these sets to generate the query sets of each round according to the PC interference matrices A κ×n and B (ν−κ)×n . The query sets for all databases are generated by Algorithm 1 through the following procedures. 1 3) Initialization (Round τ = 1): In the initialization step, the algorithm generates the auxiliary queries for the first round. This round is described in lines 5 to 11 of Algorithm 1, where we have τ = 1 for the τ -sum. At this point, Algorithm 1 invokes the subroutine Initial-Round given in Algorithm 2 to generate Q
, such that each of these query sets contains α 1 = κ µ−1 distinct symbols. Furthermore, to maintain function symmetry, the algorithm asks each database for the same number of distinct symbols of all other functions evaluations in Q
, resulting in a total number of µ−1 1 κ µ−1 symbols. As a result, the queried symbols in the auxiliary query sets for each database are symmetric with respect to all function evaluation vectors indexed by v ∈ [µ]. We associate the symbols of undesired functions evaluations in κ groups, each placed in the undesired query sets Q
Since this procedure produces κ undesired query sets for each database, database symmetry is maintained. 4) Desired Function Symbols for Rounds τ > 1: For the following rounds a similar process is repeated in terms of generating auxiliary query sets containing distinct symbols from the desired function evaluation
. This is accomplished in lines 16 to 18 by calling the subroutine Desired-Q, given in Algorithm 3, to generate Q
, such that each of these query sets contains
5) Side Information Exploitation:
In lines 20 to 22, we generate the side information query sets Q
, by applying the subroutine Exploit-SI, given by Algorithm 4. This subroutine is extended from [17] based on our coded storage scenario. These side information query sets will be exploited by the user to ensure the recovery and privacy of the subsequent PC schemes. Note that in Algorithm 4 the function
j (U; τ − 1) denotes a procedure that divides a set into κ disjoint equally-sized subsets. This is viable since based on the subroutine Initial-Round and the following subroutine M-Sym, one can show that
, which is always divisible by κ. Secondly, we assign the new query set of desired symbols Q (v) j (a i,j , D; τ ) for the current round by using an element-wise set addition SetAddition(Q 1 , Q 2 ). The element-wise set addition is defined as
where ρ is an appropriate integer. In lines 33 to 37, the subroutine M-Sym, given in Algorithm 5, is invoked to generate the undesired query sets Q (v) j (a i,j , U; τ ) by utilizing message symmetry. This subroutine selects symbols of undesired functions evaluations to generate τ -sums that enforce symmetry in the round queries. The procedure resembles the subroutine M-Sym proposed in [17] . In Algorithm 5, Π τ denotes the set of all possible selections of τ distinct indices in [µ] and Lexico(Π τ ) denotes the corresponding set of ordered selections (the indices (v 1 , . . . , v τ ) of a selection of Π τ are ordered in natural lexicographical order). Further, the notation U (v x ) * ,j implies that the row index of the symbol can be arbitrary. This is the case since only the function indices (v 1 , . . . , v τ ) are necessary to determine i z , ∀ z ∈ [τ ]. As a result, symmetry over the functions is maintained. Moreover, for Q
, we obtain for each τ ∈ [2 : µ] the remaining τ -sum types, such that each of these query sets contains µ−1 τ κ µ−(τ −1+1) (ν − κ) τ −1 symbols. 6) Query Set Assembly: Finally, in lines 39 to 48, we assemble each query set from disjoint query subsets obtained in all τ rounds. It can be shown that Q
For the initialization round, τ = 1, from step 3) above, the total number of queried symbols is given by
1 Note that a query Q refers to the particular symbols requested through the query. In Algorithm 1, with some abuse of notation for the sake of simplicity, the generated queries are sets containing their answers.
Algorithm 1: Q-Gen
Input : v, µ, κ, ν, n, A κ×n , and B (ν−κ)×n Output: Q
Generate query sets for the initial round Generate desired symbols for the following rounds τ > 1 16 for
Generate side information for the following rounds τ > 1 20 for
Generate the final desired query sets for the following rounds τ > 1
Generate the query sets of undesired symbols by forcing message symmetry for the following rounds τ > 1 
For the following rounds, τ ∈ [2 : µ], from steps 4) and 5) above, we have
In summary, the total number of queries generated by Algorithm 1 is
7) Privacy: It is worth mentioning that the queries generated by Algorithm 1 inherently satisfy the privacy condition of (2a), which is guaranteed by satisfying the index, message, and database symmetry principles as for all the PIR schemes in [11] , [13] , [16] . We also would like to emphasize that the achievable rates of our proposed PC schemes can be further improved by removing the redundant queries caused from the dependency among the virtual messages. Note that this will not break the privacy condition and will be discussed together with recovery in the following sections for each of the proposed PC schemes.
As mentioned at the beginning of this section, the presented generic query generation is, so far, a PIR-like scheme from a linearly-coded DSS with dependent virtual messages representing the evaluations of the candidate functions. In contrast to simple PIR solutions, in PC we have the opportunity to exploit the dependencies induced by performing computations over the same set of messages, i.e., the f independent messages W (1) , . . . , W (f ) , while keeping the requested index v private from each database. As shown in the recent PC literature (e.g., [17] , [18] , [20] ), one is able to exploit this dependency to optimize the download cost by trading communication overhead with offline computation performed at the user side. In the following, we exploit the redundancy among the virtual messages X (v) , v ∈ [µ], to enhance the achievable rate and accordingly tailor the Q-Gen algorithm to the case of PLC in Section VI, and to the general case of PPC in Sections VII and VIII, respectively.
VI. PRIVATE LINEAR COMPUTATION FROM CODED DSSS
One of the main results of this paper is the derivation of the PLC capacity for a coded DSS where data is encoded and stored using a linear code from the class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes [16] . The problem of PLC translates, in the PPC setup, to restricting the candidate function set to polynomials of degree g = 1. Based on the PLC converse bound of Theorem 3, in this section we represent PLC as a special case of PPC and construct a capacity-achieving scheme using the generic query generation algorithm of Section V. In the following Theorem 4, we settle the PLC capacity for a DSS where data is stored using an MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code.
Theorem 4. Consider a DSS with n noncolluding databases that uses an [n, k] MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code C to store f messages. Then, the maximum achievable PLC rate over all possible PLC protocols, i.e., the PLC capacity C PLC , is
We remark that since all MDS codes are MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes, it follows that if rank(V) = f , then the PLC capacity for an MDS-coded DSS is equal to the MDS-PIR capacity C MDS-PIR [20] .
In PLC, a user wishes to privately compute exactly one linear function evaluation from the µ candidate linear functions evaluations X (1) , . . . , X (µ) from the coded DSS. With
, is mapped by (5) . Hence, the user privately generates an index v ∈ [µ] and wishes to compute the v-th linear function while keeping the index v private from each database. The capacity-achieving PLC scheme is provided in the following subsections.
A. Query Generation for PLC
We use the generic query generation algorithm of Section V (see Algorithm 1) . Given that the messages are stored using an [n, k] MDS-PIR capacity-achieving code C , we can construct a ν × n MDS-PIR capacity-achieving matrix Λ PIR κ,ν . This matrix is used for the generic PC achievable rate matrix Λ PC κ,ν , and we can obtain the PC interference matrices A κ×n and B (ν−κ)×n as defined in Section V-A (see Definition 8) . As a result, we require the size of the messages to be L = ν µ · k (i.e., β = ν µ ). In PLC, (22) can simply be written as U 
B. Sign Assignment and Redundancy Elimination
Our proposed PLC scheme is further constructed with two additional procedures: sign assignment and redundancy elimination. After running Algorithm 1, the user will know which row indices of the stored code symbols he/she is going to request. To reduce the total number of downloaded symbols, the linear dependency among the candidate linear functions evaluations is exploited. To this end, an initial sign σ (v) t is first privately generated by the user with a uniform distribution over {−1, +1} for all t ∈ [β], i.e., the same selected sign is identically applied to all symbols from different function evaluations with the same index. Next, depending on the desired linear function index v ∈ [µ], we apply a deterministic sign assignment procedure that carefully scales each pre-signed symbol in the query sets, i.e., σ
The intuition behind the sign assignment is to introduce a uniquely solvable equation system from the different τ -sum types given the side information available from all other databases. By obtaining such a system of equations in each round, the user can determine some of the queries offline to decode the desired linear function evaluations and/or interference, thus reducing the download rate. On the other hand, the privately selected initial sign for σ
, acts as a one-time pad that randomizes over the deterministic sign assignment procedure. Here, we adopt a similar sign assignment process over each symbol in the query sets, as introduced in [17, Sec. IV-B]. Moreover, we remark that after sign assignment, the recovery condition of the scheme is inherently maintained since it can be seen as a coded PIR scheme as in [16] . Based on this insight we can state the following lemma for redundancy elimination. . The proof for Lemma 3 is based on the insight that the redundancy resulting from the linear dependencies between virtual messages is also present with MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes. Accordingly, the derivations of Lemma 3 are omitted for brevity. The optimality and privacy of the scheme is similar as in the motivating example of Section III.
We now make the final modification to our PLC query sets by first directly applying the sign assignment over σ
, and then remove the τ -sums corresponding to redundant τ -sum types from every round τ ∈ [µ − r] according Lemma 3. Note that the amount of redundancy is dependent on the rank of the functions matrix, rank(V) = r ≤ min{µ, f }, thus generalizing the MDS-coded PLC case. Finally, we generate the queries Q is a PIR achievable rate matrix. According to Definition 8 we obtain the PC interference matrices A 1×4 = 1 2 1 2 and B 1×4 = 2 1 2 1 . Suppose that the user wishes to obtain a linear function evaluation X (v) from a set of µ = 4 candidate linear functions evaluations, whose V µ×f from (5) is given by
We simplify notation by letting x t,j = U
t,j , and w t,j = U
t,j for all t ∈ [β], j ∈ [n], where β = ν µ = 16. Let the desired linear function index be v = 1. For this example, the construction of the query sets is briefly presented in the following steps. 2 Initialization (Round τ = 1): Algorithm 1 starts with τ = 1 to generate auxiliary query sets for each database holding κ µ−1 = 1 distinct instances of x t,j . By message symmetry this also applies to y t,j , z t,j , and w t,j . The auxiliary query sets for the first round are shown in Table III(a). Note that the queries for z t,j and w t,j can be generated offline by the user and thus are later removed from the query sets. Moreover, in Table III (a), we highlight in red the information set indicator u ∈ [ν] as specified by the interference matrix A 1×4 , i.e., u = a 1,j . Using this indicator, we determine the indices of the queried symbols as seen in the algorithm Initial-Round, i.e., Algorithm 2.
Following Rounds (τ > 1): As can be seen from j (a 1,j , D; τ ) containing desired linear function evaluations to be decoded by exploiting side information. In particular, the algorithm generated (τ − 1)-sums of side information containing symbols from undesired linear functions evaluations based on A κ×n in the previous round. In the current round, it generates desired symbols as sums of a single symbol from the desired linear function evaluation and side information based on B (ν−κ)×n . Similar to Table III(a), in Table III( j (a 1,j , D; τ ) following the algorithm Desired-Q, i.e., Algorithm 3. In addition, we illustrate with magenta dashed arrows the side information exploitation following the algorithm Exploit-SI, i.e., Algorithm 4. Note that, by utilizing the code coordinates forming an information set in the code array, it can be shown that the side information based on B (ν−κ)×n can be decoded. For example, in round 3, since {2, 4} is an information set of the storage code C , the code symbols y 6,1 + z 4,1 and y 6,3 + z 4,3 can be obtained by knowing y 6,2 + z 4,2 and y 6,4 + z 4,4 , from which the corresponding symbols x 6,1 and x 6,3 can be obtained by canceling the side information. Hence, the symbols from the desired linear function can be obtained. After generating the desired auxiliary query sets Q (1) j (a 1,j , D; τ ), the undesired auxiliary query sets Q (1) j (a 1,j , U; τ ) are generated by enforcing message symmetry. In Table III(b)-(d), we indicate with cyan arrows the message symmetry enforcement procedure following the algorithm M-Sym, i.e., Algorithm 5, and with red the resulting index symmetry in Q Finally, we apply the sign assignment process to the query sets for v = 1. The resulting queries after sign assignment are shown in Table IV . Similar to the motivating example of Section III, Lemma 3 will be used to remove the redundant queries from each database, and one can show that the desired linear function evaluation X (1) can still be recovered. This completes the recovery part. For example, in round 2 and for the 1st database, one can verify that 1(y 7,1 − w 3,1 ) − 1(y 5,1 − z 3,1 ) − (1 · 1 − 3 · 1)x 3,1 − 3x 5,1 + 1x 7,1 = 1(y 7,1 − 3x 3,1 − 1y 3,1 ) − (y 5,1 − x 3,1 − y 3,1 ) + 2x 3,1 − 3x 5,1 + x 7,1 = (x 7,1 + y 7,1 ) − (3x 5,1 + y 5,1 ) = z 7,1 − w 5,1 ,
and hence we do not need to download the 2-sum z 7,1 − w 5,1 . Similarly, we can do the same process for the other databases. The redundant queries are marked in blue in Table IV and For completeness, we also show that the user's privacy is still maintained after the removal of redundant queries, which follows from a similar argument as in the motivating example of Section III. Here, we only need to show that for any desired index v ∈ [4] , the removed redundant τ -sums can be chosen to be of the same type. For instance, let us consider the 1st database. In the 2nd round, see Table IV , it can be shown that the queries for desired index v = 3 satisfy the equation
− (x 5,1 + y 5,1 ) + (x 7,1 + y 7,1 ) = 1(y 7,1 − (3x 5,1 + y 5,1 )) = y 7,1 − w 5,1 , which implies that the 2-sum z 7,1 − w 2,1 can be removed from the download, since z 7,1 can be obtained from downloading x 5,1 − y 3,1 , x 7,1 − w 3,1 , x 2,1 − z 3,1 , y 2,1 − z 5,1 , and y 7,1 − w 5,1 . Hence, the redundant τ -sum type for v = 3 can be chosen to be equal to the redundant τ -sum type for v = 1 (see (24) ). A similar argument can be made for v = 2 and v = 4, which ensures the privacy of the scheme. ♦ 
where we recall that m n = 0 if m < n; (a) follows from the PLC rate in Definition 3, (23), and Lemma 3; (b) follows from Definition 5; and (c) follows by adapting similar steps as in the proof given in [20] (see also the proof of the achievable PPC rate of Theorem 5 in Section VII-E). Note that the rate in (25) matches the converse in Theorem 3, which proves Theorem 4.
VII. A GENERAL PPC SCHEME FOR RS-CODED DSSS WITH LAGRANGE ENCODING
In the following, we build a PPC scheme based on Lagrange encoding and our PLC scheme in Section VI. Note that a higher degree polynomial, i.e., g > 1, can be written as a linear combination of monomials, and therefore any private monomial computation (PMC) scheme is a special case of PPC. Thus, a PPC scheme can be obtained from a PLC scheme by replacing independent messages with a monomial basis. We first discuss the PPC case in general and then provide an example for the special case of PMC.
In RS-coded DSSs, each message is encoded using an [n, k] RS code as follows. Each W (m) i is encoded by an RS code RS k (α) with evaluation vector α = (α 1 , . . . , α n ) over F q into a length-n codeword C 
A. Lagrange Coded Computation
Lagrange coded computation [26] is a framework that can be applied to any function computation when the function of interest is a multivariate polynomial of the messages. We extend the application of this framework to PMC and PPC by utilizing the following argument. Let t . Now, given a multivariate polynomial function φ(W t,j ) of degree at most g, we introduce the composition function ψ t (z) = φ( t (z)). Accordingly, evaluating ψ t (z) at any γ j , j ∈ [k], is equal to evaluating the polynomial function over the uncoded information symbols, i.e., φ(W t,j ) and similarly, evaluating ψ t (z) at α j , j ∈ [n], will result in the evaluation of the polynomial function over the coded symbols, i.e., φ(C t,j ). Since each Lagrange interpolation polynomial of t (z) is a polynomial of degree at most k − 1, it follows that deg(ψ t (z)) ≤ g(k − 1) and we require up to g(k − 1) + 1 coefficients to interpolate and determine the polynomial ψ t (z).
Note that ψ t (z) is a linear combination of monomials z i ∈ F q [z], i ≤ g(k − 1), and the underlying codeC for (ψ t (α 1 ), . . . , ψ t (α n )), referred to as the polynomial decoding code, is given by the g-fold star-product RS g k (α) of the storage code RS k (α) according to [22, Lem. 6] . This is due to the fact that the span of RS g k (α) is given by linear combinations of codewords in RS g k (α) where each code symbol represents a monomial. With other words, to construct coded PPC schemes that retrieve polynomials of degree at most g, we require g(k − 1) + 1 ≤ n and dC min ≥ n − (g(k − 1) + 1) + 1, where dC min denotes the minimum distance ofC , to be able to decode the computation correctly. It follows from Proposition 1 thatC = RSk(α) with dimensionk = min{g(k −1)+1, n} = g(k −1) + 1 and dC min = n −k + 1 = n − (g(k − 1) + 1) + 1.
B. PPC Achievable Rate Matrix
We now specialize the definition of a generic PC achievable rate matrix from Definition 7 to the coded PPC problem as follows.
Definition 11. Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code and denote byC = C g thek-dimensional code generated by the g-fold star-product of C with itself. A ν × n binary matrix Λ PPC κ,ν is called a PPC achievable rate matrix for (C ,C ), if it is a generic PC achievable rate matrix with κ ν =k n , and for each row
Similar to the PLC scheme presented in Section VI-A, the resulting PPC scheme requires the length of each message to be L = ν µ · k. The queries Q (v) j are generated by setting (κ, ν) = (k, n) and invoking Algorithm 1 from Section V as follows:
n } ← Q-Gen(v, µ,k, n, n, Ak ×n , B (n−k)×n ).
C. Sign Assignment and Redundancy Elimination
Here, we generalize the coded PLC scheme of Section VI in terms of exploiting the dependency between the virtual messages. Since any polynomial is a linear function of the monomial basis of size M(f, g), a PPC scheme can be seen as a PLC scheme performed over a set of M(f, g) messages. Hence, the redundancy resulting from the linear dependencies between the virtual messages is also present for PPC and we can extend Lemma 3 and [17, Lem. 1] to this scheme. To exploit the dependency between the virtual messages we adopt a similar sign assignment process to each queried symbol of the virtual monomial messages as mentioned in Section VI-B. Using Lagrange interpolation, we will show that it results in a uniquely solvable equation system from the different τ -sum types given the side information available from all other databases. By obtaining such a system of equations in each round τ ∈ [µ] of the protocol, the user can determine some of the answers offline. Now, consider τ -sum types for τ = 1, where we download individual segments of each virtual message including f independent messages. For this type, the user can determine any polynomial from the f obtained message segments. Based on this insight we can state the following lemma. In the next subsection, we show that the privacy and recovery conditions of our proposed PPC scheme are satisfied.
D. Recovery and Privacy
The scheme works as the PLC scheme in Section VI using the codeC instead of the storage code C . This is the case since for any polynomial evaluation code D, D * i ⊆ D * j for all i ∈ [j], j ∈ N, since the all-ones codeword is in D (see also [22, Lem. 6] ). Moreover, since the definition of the PPC achievable rate matrix in Definition 11 is analogous to the corresponding definition of a PIR achievable rate matrix in Definition 4 (by using C instead of C ), it can directly be seen that the arguments in the proof of [16, Thm. 1] (see [16, App. B]) can be applied. Hence, it follows thatk distinct evaluations of ψ t (z) = φ( t (z)) for each segment t can be recovered. Since deg(ψ t (z)) ≤k − 1, it follows that the polynomial ψ t (z) can be reconstructed via polynomial interpolation and then the desired polynomial functions evaluations can be recovered by evaluating ψ t (z) at γ j , j ∈ [k], which is equal to evaluating the desired polynomial φ(·) over the uncoded information symbols, i.e., φ(W t,j ) due to Lagrange encoding.
As for the privacy of the PPC scheme, using an argumentation similar to the PLC scheme, it can be seen that for any desired index v ∈ [µ], the redundant τ -sum types according to Lemma 4 can be fixed, i.e., the same τ -sum types are redundant for all v ∈ [µ], and hence the queries satisfy the privacy condition. See also Example 3 below which illustrates that the privacy and recovery conditions are indeed satisfied.
E. Achievable PPC Rate
SinceC is an [n,k] MDS code (C is an RS code), there always exists a PPC achievable rate matrix Λ PPC κ,ν with κ ν =k n . Hence, using Lemma 4 we can prove the following theorem. Theorem 5. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] RS code C to store f messages over n noncolluding databases using Lagrange encoding. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the number of candidate polynomial functions evaluations of degree at most g, including the f independent messages. Then, the PPC rate is achievable.
Proof: From (23) and Lemma 4, the achievable PPC rate after removing redundant τ -sums becomes
where ( = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n}, i.e., n = g(k − 1) + 1 (since n cannot be strictly smaller than g(k − 1) + 1 by assumption and (b) is from Proposition 1), then it follows directly from (27) that R = k nf H min . Moreover, in can be seen in this case that the proposed scheme reduces to the trivial scheme where the f independent files are downloaded and then the desired function evaluation is performed offline. However, the proposed scheme requires an unnecessarily high redundancy to decode the f files, i.e.,k = n instead ofk = k. As a result, for the case of n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, we opt out of any other achievable scheme and achieve the PPC rate 1 f H min by simply downloading all f files and performing the desired function evaluation offline. Otherwise, i.e., ν > κ, or equivalently (from Definition 11), n >k = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n}, i.e., n > g(k − 1) + 1, then from (27) we have
where (c) follows since ν > κ; (d) holds since we have κ ν =k n from Definition 11; and (e) follows by defining η max{µ − M(f, g), 0} and the fact that m n = 0 if m < n. Corollary 1. Consider a DSS that uses an [n, k] RS code C to store f messages over n noncolluding databases using Lagrange encoding. Let µ ∈ [f : µ(f, g)] be the number of candidate polynomial functions evaluations of degree at most g, including the f independent messages. Then, the PPC rate
is achievable as f → ∞.
Proof: If n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, then it follows from (26) that the PPC rate approaches zero as f → ∞, which is in accordance with (28) . Otherwise, if n > g(k − 1) + 1, the result follows directly from (26) by taking the limit f → ∞ and using the fact thatk (a) = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n} = g(k − 1) + 1 < n, where (a) follows from Proposition 1.
Note that the asymptotic PPC rate in (28) is equal to the rate of the general scheme from [22] when H min = 1. This difference is due to the simplified rate definition used in [22] . Moreover, our proposed scheme cannot readily be obtained using the concept of refinement and lifting of so-called one-shot schemes as introduced for PIR in [29] , since this concept cannot readily be applied to the function computation case.
F. Special Case: PMC Scheme
As the rate of PMC is a decreasing function of the number of candidate monomial functions, we can increase the PMC rate by limiting ourselves to the set of monomials excluding parallel monomials, where we define a parallel monomial as a monomial resulting from raising another monomial to a positive integer power, i.e., to {W i : i ∈ N f 0 , 1 ≤ wt(i) ≤ g, i | p, p ∈ P g }, where P g denotes the set of prime numbers less or equal to g and i = (i 1 , . . . , i f ) | p means that all nonzero i j , j ∈ [f ], are divisors of p. For example, for a bivariate monomial over the variables x and y of degree at most g = 2 the set of possible monomials is {x, y, xy, x 2 , y 2 }. Note that x 2 is a parallel monomial as it can be obtained by raising the monomial x to the power of 2. Thus, x 2 and y 2 are parallel monomials and can be excluded from the set of candidate monomials. Denote by P = {p 1 , . . . , p |P| } an arbitrary nonempty subset of P g . By applying the Legendre formula for counting the prime numbers less or equal to g, we obtain the number of nonparallel monomials as
We illustrate the key concept of our proposed scheme in Theorem 5 with an example. Example 3. Consider two messages W (1) and W (2) that are stored in a noncolluding DSS using a [4, 2] RS code C . Suppose that the user wishes to obtain a monomial function evaluation X (v) from the set of nonparallel monomial functions of degree at most g = 2. We have µ = Ă M(2, 2) = 3, v ∈ [3] , and the candidate set of monomial functions evaluations is {W (1) , W (2) , W (1) W (2) }, where denotes element-wise multiplication. Let the desired monomial function index be v = 1, i.e., the user wishes to obtain the function evaluation X (1) = W (1) . We havẽ k = g(k − 1) + 1 = 3 and from Definition 8. We simplify notation by letting x t,j = C
t,j , y t,j = C
t,j , and z t,j = C
t,j for all t ∈ [β], j ∈ [n], where β = ν µ = 64. Since the desired function evaluation is X (1) , the goal is to privately obtain x t,j , t ∈ [β], and successfully decode X (1) . The construction of the query sets is briefly presented in the following steps. 3 Initialization (Round τ = 1): We start with τ = 1 to generate query sets for each database j holding κ µ = 27 distinct instances of x t,j . By message symmetry this also applies to y t,j and z t,j .
Following Rounds (τ ∈ [2 : 3]): Using the PC interference matrices A 3×4 and B 1×4 for the exploitation of side information for the j-th database, j ∈ [n], we generate the desired query sets Q (1) j (D; τ ) by querying a number of new symbols of the desired monomial jointly combined with symbols from other monomials queried in the previous round from database i = j. Next, the undesired query sets Q (1) j (U; τ ) (if τ = 2) are generated by enforcing message symmetry.
In the end, we we apply the sign assignment procedure to the query sets for v = 1 and make the final modification to the queries by removing all redundant 1-sum types from the first round (see Lemma 4) . This translates to removing the queries for z t,j , since they can be generated offline by the user given x t,j and y t,j . The resulting query sets are shown in Table V , where u a:b,j {u a,j , . . . , u b,j } for u = x, y, z, and the side information is highlighted with blue and red for rounds τ = 2 and τ = 3, respectively. Similar to Example 2, by using Lagrange interpolation, it can be shown that the side information based on B (ν−κ)×n can be decoded. For instance, in round 2, since y 1:3,1 , y 1:3,2 , y 1:3,3 obtained from round 1 are enough to reconstruct the associated Lagrange interpolation polynomial, the side information y 1:3,4 can be obtained, from which the desired polynomial function evaluations x 43:45,4 can be decoded by side information cancellation. Note that in this example, it is clear that z t,j is redundant, no matter which v is requested, and hence privacy is ensured. The PMC rate of the scheme is equal to kν µ H min D = 2×4 3 3×4×28 H min = 0.3810 · H min , where the value of H min = H(X (3) ) depends on the underlying field. ♦ VIII. PPC SCHEME FOR RS-CODED DSSS WITH SYSTEMATIC LAGRANGE ENCODING In this section, we consider the case of RS-coded DSSs with systematic Lagrange encoding and first specialize the definition of a generic PC achievable rate matrix from Definition 7 to this scenario.
A. PPC Systematic Achievable Rate Matrix
In contrast to the PPC scheme in Section VII, the basic idea is to utilize the systematic part of the RS code to recover the requested function evaluation directly, i.e., we do not need to interpolate the systematic downloaded symbols to determine the requested function evaluation. Thus, we can further enhance the download rate. However, due to the generic PC query design principles, namely, message symmetry and side information exploitation, we are restricted in how to exploit side information obtained from the systematic nodes. Specifically, for decodability (side information cancellation) to be possible, the side information obtained from the systematic nodes must be utilized in an isolated manner within an information set of the polynomial decoding code (see Section VII-A), such that we can reverse the order of the decoding procedure (i.e., unlike our RS-coded PPC scheme, we interpolate first and then cancel the side information). This restriction is further illustrated by a careful construction of a PPC systematic achievable rate matrix (Definition 12 below) and the corresponding interference matrices. Moreover, we modify the general PPC scheme to utilize only the necessary number of nodes, denoted byn, that guarantee the isolated use of systematic side information. Accordingly, we specialize Definition 7 as follows. 
Then, a ν ×n binary matrix Λ S,PPC κ,ν is called a PPC systematic achievable rate matrix for (C ,C ) if the following conditions are satisfied.
1) Λ S,PPC κ,ν is a κ-column regular matrix, and 2) there are exactly
The following lemma shows how to construct a PPC systematic achievable rate matrix with (κ, ν) = k,n − ñ k (k − k) . Lemma 5. Let C be an arbitrary [n, k] code andC = C g . Then, there exists a PPC systematic achievable rate matrix Λ S,PPC
wherek is the dimension ofC . Proof: Letδ ñ k and Γ n −δk. From our choices ofn in (29) , one can verify that Γ ≤ k and Γ is well-defined. Accordingly, construct a matrix A k×n as in Definition 8 with
In this way, kΓ entries of A k×n are filled. Next, let {a i (j) 1 ,j , . . . , a i (j) u(j) ,j }, j ∈ [n], denote the remaining empty entries in column j of A k×n , where u(j) ≤ k is the number of empty entries in column j. Hence, the kn − kΓ = k(n − Γ) entries 
In a similar manner, the remaining case in (32) can be shown.
In the following lemma, we show a lower bound to the fraction κ ν . Lemma 7. If a matrix Λ S,PPC κ,ν (C ,C ) exists for an [n, k] code C and the [n,k] codeC , then we have 
Thus, we have
from which the result follows. Now, similar to the PLC scheme presented in Section VI-A, the systematic PPC scheme requires the length of each message to be L = ν µ · k. The queries Q (v) j are generated by setting (κ, ν) = (k,n − ñ k (k − k)) and invoking Algorithm 1 from Section V as follows:
Note that we utilizen ≤ n databases, including the systematic nodes, in constructing the scheme, while the remaining n −n databases are not queried.
B. Sign Assignment and Redundancy Elimination
Since this scheme is a modified version of the general PPC scheme where we utilize the systematic part of the RS code to recover the requested function evaluation directly, the scheme inherently extend the same redundancy and sign assignment arguments stated in Section VII-C. The only difference between the general PPC scheme and the systematic PPC scheme lies within the following recovery argument.
C. Recovery and Privacy
The scheme works as the PPC scheme in Section VI, however by mixing between the codeC and the storage code C . Due to this mixture, we require a more complicated decoding process. The key idea of the scheme is illustrated in Example 4 below. using Definition 8. For the desired function evaluation X (1) , i.e., v = 1, and µ = 3 candidate monomial functions evaluations, the resulting query sets are shown in Table VI . Here, similar to Example 3, we deploy the simplified notation x t,j = C
2×4×15 H min = 0.45 · H min is achievable, where the value of H min = H(X (3) ) depends on the underlying field. 5 Now we show that the L = kν µ = 54 symbols of the desired function evaluation can be reliably decoded. Note that here we assume that the nodes j ∈ {1, 2} are systematic. The goal is to obtain all the desired function evaluation symbols, i.e., the function evaluation symbols for j ∈ {1, 2}.
Initialization (Round τ = 1): The following steps are taken. 1) Obtain the desired symbols: From the answers retrieved for the query sets Q
j (D, 1), utilize the information setsĨ 1 = {1, 3, 4} andĨ 2 = {2, 3, 4} ofC to decode the symbols of the desired function evaluation X (1) for j ∈ {1, 2}. In other words, from x 1:4,1 , x 1:4,3 , and x 1:4,4 we use Lagrange interpolation to obtain x 1:4,2 . Similarly, from x 5:8,2 , x 5:8,3 , and x 5:8,4 we obtain x 5:8,1 . Finally, from the information set I = {1, 2} of C we readily have x 9:12,1 and x 9:12,2 . By the end of this round, we have obtained kν(κ µ−1 ) = 24 symbols from the desired function evaluation X (1) . 2) Prepare the side information: We prepare the side information symbols retrieved in this round to be used in the next round by the following steps. First, for the answers of the query sets Q (1) j (U, 1), repeat the previous step to decode the undesired symbols y 5:8,1 and y 1:4,2 . Next, since in this round, due to redundancy elimination, we retrieve symbols of polynomials of degree one, i.e., symbols from the f = 2 independent files, we can use Lagrange interpolation with k = 2 symbols from the systematic nodes to obtain coded symbols for j / ∈ {1, 2}. Accordingly, from x 9:12,1 and x 9:12,2 we obtain x 9:12,3 and x 9:12,4 . Similarly for y 9:12,3 and y 9:12,4 . Finally, using the dependency between x, y, and z and the available symbols, compute z 5:8,1 , z 1:4,2 , z 9:12,3 , and z 9:12,4 . The obtained symbols are shown in Table VII k < k due to the construction of the interference matrix in the proof of Lemma 5. In particular, the condition is equivalent to Γ < k. Using the obtained symbols from the previous step, colored in Table VII forQ (1) j (D, 3) with blue, along with the side information downloaded in the previous round in Q (1) j (U, 2), generate ñ k k − (n − k) = 1 new τ -sums with identical indices to the τ -sums retrieved from the nonsystematic nodes. These newly generated symbols are shown inQ (1) j (U, 3).
3) Obtain the desired symbols: Here, we reverse the order of operation of the previous rounds where we use Lagrange interpolation first and then cancel the side information. First, utilize the information setsĨ 1 = {1, 3, 4} andĨ 2 = {2, 3, 4} ofC to decode the τ -sums containing the desired function evaluation for j ∈ {1, 2}. As a result, we obtain x 26,1 + y 24,1 − z 22,1 and x 25,2 + y 23,2 − z 21,2 . Next, cancel the side information from the τ -sums directly obtained from Q (1) j (U, 2) for j ∈ {1, 2}. Finally, by the end of this round, we have obtained the final kν( µ−1 τ −1 κ µ−τ (ν − κ) τ −1 ) = 6 symbols from the desired function evaluation X (1) . In summary, the total number of desired function evaluation symbols obtained from this decoding process is kν
♦ Remark 1. The systematic scheme above reduces to the systematic PPC scheme presented in [2] if and only if n −k ≤ k. In particular, this happens if and only if the storage code rate k/n ≥ k/(k + g(k − 1) + 1). Otherwise, n is smaller than n and the PPC rate becomes larger than the one for the systematic scheme in [2] .
Remark 1 can be easily verified with the following argument. The two schemes are equivalent if and only if n =n and ν = k + min{k, n −k} (see [2, Thm. 2] ). Assume that n −k ≤ k. Then, 1 ≤ ñ k ≤ 1 + k k ≤ 2. If ñ k = 1, then it follows directly from (29) and Lemma 6 that n =n and ν = k + n −k = k + min{k, n −k}. Otherwise, if ñ k = 2, then k =k, 3k > n ≥ 2k, and from (29), we haven = k +k = 2k. Since, by assumption, we have n −k ≤ k, it follows that n ≤ k +k = 2k. Combining the two inequalities over n, specifically, 3k > n ≥ 2k and n ≤ 2k, we conclude that n = 2k and it holds that n =n. Now, from Lemma 6, ν = 2k = k + min{k, n −k}, and the equivalence of the two schemes follows. The "only-if" part follows in a similar manner. Finally, the lower bound on the storage code rate follows directly from the condition n −k ≤ k.
D. Achievable PPC Rate
Using Lemmas 4 and 5, the following theorem follows. andn as defined in (29), is achievable.
Proof: From (23) and by removing redundant τ -sums from the query sets according to Lemma 4, the achievable PPC rate becomes
where (a) follows from the PPC rate in Definition 3, (23), and Lemma 4. Now, we first consider the case where ν = κ and show that it is equivalent to n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1. Assume that ν = κ = k. Then, for the first case of (32) it follows thatk = n. For the second and third cases of (32), to obtain ν = k, we must have ñ k = 1 or ñ k = 0, respectively, which violates the condition of the second case and is never true for the third case. Since, by Proposition 1,k = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n} = n, it follows that n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1. Conversely, if n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, thenk = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n} = n, and it follows from (32) (the first case) that ν = κ. Hence, in summary, we have shown that ν = κ is equivalent to n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1. As a result, for n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, it follows directly from (34) that R = k nf H min . Moreover, it can be seen in this case that the proposed systematic PPC scheme reduces to the trivial scheme for which all the f independent files are downloaded and the desired function evaluation is performed offline. However, similar to the general PPC scheme, the proposed systematic PPC scheme requires an unnecessarily high redundancy to decode the f files, i.e.,k =n instead ofk = k. As a result, for the case of n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, we again opt out of any other achievable scheme and achieve the PPC rate 1 f H min by simply downloading all f files and performing the desired function evaluation offline.
On the other hand, if ν > κ, or equivalently, n > g(k − 1) + 1, then from (34) we have 
withn as defined in (29), is asymptotically achievable for f → ∞.
Proof: If n ≤ g(k − 1) + 1, then it follows from (33) that the PPC rate approaches zero as f → ∞, which is in accordance with (35) (first case, since ñ k = 1 and n − ñ k k = 0 < k). Otherwise, if n > g(k − 1) + 1, the result follows directly from (33) by taking the limit f → ∞ and using (32) and the fact (see Proposition 1) that k = min{g(k − 1) + 1, n} = g(k − 1) + 1. Number of messages f PMC rate R Converse bound (Thm. 2) RS-L (Thm. 5) PPC scheme [22] Sys. RS-L (Thm. 6) Sys. PPC scheme [21] (a) For µ = M(f, 2). [22] Sys. RS-L (Thm. 6) Sys. PPC scheme [21] (b) For µ = Ă M(f, 2). Note that when n−k ≤ k, the asymptotic PPC rate in (35) is equal to the rate of the systematic scheme from [21, Thm. 3], [22] when H min = 1. This difference is due to the simplified rate definition used in [21] , [22] . However, for the case when n −k > k, with the simplified rate definition, i.e., for H min = 1, the asymptotic PPC rate in (35) is larger compared to the PPC rate of the systematic scheme from [21, Thm. 3] , [22] . See also Remark 1.
IX. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In Fig. 3a , we compare the PMC rates of Theorems 5 and 6 to those of the schemes from [21] , [22] as well as the converse bound from Theorem 2 (using the exact information-theoretic rate from Definition 3) for n = 7, k = 2, g = 2, and computations over F 3 . The scheme from Theorem 5 shows improved performance for a low number of messages f , while the systematic scheme from Theorem 6 shows improved performance for all values of f , even in the asymptotic case of f → ∞. As the number of messages f grows, the curve from Theorem 5 converges to the rate from [22] , as can be seen from Corollary 1, while the asymptotic performance of the systematic scheme follows from Corollary 2 (second case). The converse bound from Theorem 2 shows a relatively large gap for all values of f . For comparison, we also plot in Fig. 3b the PMC rate when parallel monomials are excluded from the candidate function set. As for the case when parallel monomials are included we observe improved performance for the systematic scheme from Theorem 6 for all values of f .
In Fig. 4 , we compare the PMC rates of Theorems 5 and 6 and those of the schemes from [21] , [22] for various values of the storage code rate α = k/n, fixed k, g = 2, µ = M(f, 2), f = 2 for Fig. 4a , and f = 10 for Fig. 4b . For a small number of files (f = 2), the proposed schemes show improved performance for all code rates, while for a relatively large number of files (f = 10), the systematic scheme from Theorem 6 shows improved performance up to some code rate (see Remark 1) . Observe that when neglecting the computational cost at the user, the trivial scheme which downloads all the f files and computes the desired function evaluation offline outperforms all considered PPC schemes when the code rate is above some threshold that depends on both f and g. For f = 10 the code rate needs to be close to 1/2 for the trivial scheme to be the best. Note that the curve for the systematic scheme follows a staircase in which there arek points on each horizontal line of the staircase. This follows directly from the term ñ k in the definition ofn in (29) .
X. CONCLUSION
We have provided the capacity of PLC from coded DSSs, where data is encoded and stored using an arbitrary linear code from the class of MDS-PIR capacity-achieving codes. Interestingly, the capacity of PLC is equal to the corresponding MDS-PIR capacity. Thus, privately retrieving arbitrary linear combinations of the stored messages Storage code rate α = k/n PMC rate R Trivial scheme: 1 f Hmin RS-L (Thm. 5) PPC scheme [22] Sys. RS-L (Thm. 6) Sys. PPC scheme [21] (a) For f = 2 and k = 2. Storage code rate α = k/n PMC rate R Trivial scheme: 1 f Hmin RS-L (Thm. 5) PPC scheme [22] Sys. RS-L (Thm. 6) Sys. PPC scheme [21] (b) For f = 10 and k = 20. Fig. 4 : PMC rates as a function of the storage code rate α = k/n for fixed f , k, g = 2, and µ = M(f, 2). For the sake of simplicity, we assume H min = 1.
does not incur any overhead in rate compared to retrieving a single message from the databases. For the PPC problem, we have presented two PPC schemes for RS-coded DSSs with Lagrange encoding showing improved computation rates compared to the best known PPC schemes from the literature when the number of messages is small. Asymptotically, as the number of messages tends to infinity, the rate of our RS-coded nonsystematic PPC scheme approaches the rate of the best known nonsystematic PPC scheme. However, for systematically RS-coded DSSs, our scheme significantly outperforms all known PPC schemes up to some specific storage code rate that depends on the maximum degree of the candidate polynomials. Finally, a general converse bound on the PPC rate was derived and compared to the achievable rates of the proposed schemes.
